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Wetlands Mitigation and Mitigation Banking in Louisiana*
I. INTRODUCTION
The swamps, bogs, sloughs, marshes, bottomlands, wet meadows,
prairies, ponds, seeps, potholes, dune grasses and seabeds of the
American landscape are the primary pollution control systems of the
nation's waters, and the primary determinants of their water quality....
These same wetlands purify and recharge ground water, providing
municipal drinking water supplies for towns and cities across the
country.'
More than seventy percent of America's commercial seafood harvest
originates in the coastal estuaries.' This translates into an estimated annual
value of $3.6 billion and an economic output of $31 billion.' Louisiana
wetlands provide at least half of the nation's seafood production with a value
ranging from $2.5 billion to $4 billion per year. The future of Louisiana's
fishing industry depends upon the survival of it's coastal wetlands because "98
percent of the seafood harvested in the Gulf of Mexico relies on those [Louisi-
ana] wetlands during part of their life cycles."' The wetland dependent fishing
industry also supplies the state with 90,000 jobs."
Copyright 1999, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Research for this publication was funded in part by the Louisiana Sea Grant College
Program, a part of the National Sea Grant College Program, maintained by NOAA, U.S. Department
of Commerce. The Louisiana Sea Grant College Program at Louisiana State University is also
supported by the State of Louisiana.
Editor's Note: The Editor would like to thank Jim Wilkins for his assistance in the production of
this commeent.
1. Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Environmental Federalism, Federalism in Wetlands
Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs
to the States, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1242, 1247 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Rhonda Bell, Deflectors Fight Coast Erosion, The New Orleans Times-Picayune, October
16, 1997, at BI.
Paul Templet of the Louisiana State University Environmental Studies Institute found that
Louisiana's fisheries "are worth at least $1 billion per year." The Associated Press, Global Warming
Meeting Turns up the Heat on Louisiana, The New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 1, 1997, at
A6.
5. Bob Anderson, Foster Vows to Fight Wetland Loss, The Baton Rouge Advocate, Friday,
May 2,1997, at lB. Mark Davis, Executive Director of the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana,
says that Louisiana wetlands "are the nursery for 80 percent of the commercial fisheries in the Gulf
of Mexico." Wetlands Loss Slows, But Hasn 't Stopped, The New Orleans Times-Picayune,
September 18, 1997, at Al.
6. Anderson, supra note 5, at I B; see also Bell, supra note 4, at B I (Fishing industry provides
100,000 jobs.).
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In America today, less than half of the original 215 million acres of wetlands
remain.7 From 1985 to 1995, wetlands disappeared nationally at the alarming
rate of 117,000 acres per year Grady McCallie of the National Wildlife
Federation estimates that "[w]e are still losing the equivalent of 12 football fields
[every] hour."9 In the Gulf of Mexico, coastal wetlands continue to be lost at
over 32,000 acres per year as a result of changes in upstream watersheds,
erosion, and other human activities.'0 In Louisiana, wetlands are disappearing
at a rate of thirty-five square miles per year or about one-half acre every ten
minutes, representing as much as eighty percent of the nation's total loss." If
the current rate of loss continues, large areas of the Louisiana coastal zone will
disappear forcing the relocation of its inhabitants in the near future. 2 "[T]he
erosion is like a spear aimed at New Orleans .... If we don't do something
now, those levees are going to be our shoreline. We need to move fast."' 3
II. WETLANDS REGULATION
Human activities affecting wetlands are regulated by federal and state permit
programs. The Federal Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit Program is
administered by the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The Louisiana parallel,
the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act's Coastal Use Permit
Program ("CUP"), is administered by the Louisiana Department of Natural
7. Houck & Rolland, supra note I, at 1251.
8. The nation's average net loss of wetlands from 1985-1995 was 117,000 acres per year
which is down from the 290,000 acre annual rate in the previous decade and the 458,000 acres the
decade before. Wetlands Loss Slows, But Hasn 't Stopped, supra note 5, at Al. But see Jon A.
Kusler, Esq., Association of Wetland Managers, No Net Loss and the Role of Wetlands Restora-
tion/Creation in a Regulatory Context 5 (on file with the author) (stating that wetland loss nationally
remains closer to 300,000 acres per year annually).
9. Wetlands Loss Slows, But Hasn't Stopped, supra note 5, at Al (quoting Grady McCallie
of the National Wildlife Federation).
Additionally, Eric E. Huber, a project attorney for Earthjustice (formerly Sierra) Legal Defense
Fund, estimated the loss in Louisiana alone to be the equivalent of a football field every 15 minutes
and blames "rampant development" for that loss. Vicki Ferstel, Environmentalists Protest Wetlands
Permit Changes, The Baton Rouge Advocate, November 1, 1997, at 3B.
10. Meeting Our Coastal Challenges (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) (on file with the author).
1I. Coastal Restoration Policy Developed, La. Coast Lines (The Dep't of Natural Resources),
Dec. 1995 at 2. See also A White Paper. The State of Louisiana's Policy for Coastal Restoration
Activities (Office of the Governor), April 24, 1995 [hereinafter Louisiana's Policy]; Anderson, supra
note 5, at I B. But other sources report a lower rate of 24 to 25 square miles per year of loss in
Louisiana totaling fifty-one percent of the nation's total loss. Wetlands Loss Slows, But Hasn 't
Stopped, supra note 5, at Al; Ferstel, supra note 9, at 3B.
12. Meeting Our Coastal Challenges (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) (on file with the author);
Coastal Restoration Policy Developed, La. Coast Lines (The Dep't of Natural Resources), Dec. 1995
at 2.
13. Bell, supra note 4, at BI (quoting Mark Davis, executive director of the Coalition to
Restore Coastal Louisiana).
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Resources ("LDNR"), in the statutorily defined Coastal Zone. 4 Restricting
activities in wetlands through permit regulation allows the agencies to assess
individual impacts on the ecosystem and to prevent those impacts from taking
place when necessary.
A. Compensatory Mitigation
Agencies usually require developer/applicants to mitigate the environmental
damage resulting from a construction project as a condition of granting a permit
to build or develop in a wetland area. Compensatory mitigation is achieved
through a process where a permittee restores, creates, or protects another wetland
in exchange for, or to replace the one destroyed. "Wetland mitigation banking"
is a type of service industry that supplies established wetlands and their
associated values that developers may purchase to fulfill the compensatory
mitigation requirements of a permit. A wetland created or restored is the "bank."
Its ecological values are quantified into "credits" that the developer purchases
from the bank. Meeting compensatory mitigation requirements through the
purchase of mitigation bank credits is beneficial to the developer who is usually
ill-equipped to successfully create such a wetland. The process is also
more efficient for regulators because banks consolidate a greater number
of permittee's mitigation into one area which can be easily monitored for
success.
Mitigation banking as defined by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") is "the restoration, creation, enhancement, and, in exceptional
circumstances, preservation of wetlands or other aquatic habitats expressly for the
purpose of providing compensatory mitigation in advance of discharges into
wetlands permitted under the Section 404 regulatory program."'" Wetland
values, which are created at the bank, are quantified by the Corps, converted into
credits, and sold to a developer. Proof of purchase of wetland bank
credits satisfies the developer's compensatory mitigation obligations under a
permit.
In 1989, before the Ducks Unlimited Sixth International Waterfowl
Symposium, then-President Bush announced the goal of "no net loss" for
wetlands in the United States. 6 In 1993, President Clinton adopted this same
stance on wetland conservation, recognizing the vital ecological and economic
importance of wetlands to the nations health and economy. 7 Recently, Vice
14. La. R.S. 49:214.21 (1998). The Coastal Zone boundary is very particularly defined in La.
R.S 49:214.24 (1998).
15. Frank E. Skillem, Environmental Protection Deskbook § 8.32 (2d ed. 1995).
16. Wetlands Task Force Meetings and Written Comments-Summary, 56 Fed. Reg. 8560-01
(1991); see also Kusler, supra note 8.
17. Robert E. Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation of
Wetlands, 34 Nat. Resources J. 781, 800 (1994); Thomas A. Sands, Protection of Wetlands ch. 16
(1995).
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President Gore carried the Clinton-Bush directive a step further by calling for a
net gain of 100,000 acres of new wetlands by 2005.8
The Clinton Administration's plan for achieving the "no net loss" goal for
wetlands utilizes a concept called "sequencing.'" 9 Sequencing is a process
requirement imposed on permit recipients ensuring that the project will first
avoid wetland impacts, then minimize any impacts, and finally provide
compensatory mitigation for all unavoidable wetland damage. 0 The mitigation
may be accomplished in a number of ways, depending upon the policy of the
particular agency issuing the permit, and may involve creating, restoring, or
enhancing damaged wetlands.2
In 1992, while national attention focused on the "no net loss" policy
promoting mitigation banking, Louisiana enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:214.41 authorizing the creation and use of mitigation banks in
Louisiana's Coastal Zone. The 1995 regulations, promulgated under this 1992
statute, create a preference for using mitigation banks to compensate for wetland
loss.
B. Mitigation Banking-An Incentive Approach
There are two competing theories at work behind wetland regulation. One
is the traditional "command and control" theory "which specifqies] uniform
technologies or performance standards that give little flexibility to regulated
finrms."2  The other is the under-explored "economic incentive" theory which
"provide[s] firms with incentives to look for more effective ways of making
sustained environmental progress. 23 Mitigation banking is a response to the
former, by utilizing the latter. Wetland banking encourages conservation through
individual profit motivation.
18. Vice President Gore also seeks to reduce the water pollution which has contributed
to the "dead zone" off the Louisiana Coast and is calling for two million miles of "buffer
strips protecting waters from agricultural runoff by... 2002." Mike Dunne, New Wetlands
Policy Lifs Hopes of Saving State's Coastline, The Baton Rouge Advocate, October 28, 1997,
at 14B.
19. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Dep't of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act
Section 404(B)(1) Guidelines, FRL-3732-3, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (Dep't of the Army 1990);
Virginia S. Albrecht, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, CA34 ALI-ABA 251, 267 (Aug. 16,
1995).
20. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Dep't
of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section
404(B)(1) Guidelines, FRL-3732-3, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (Dep't of the Army 1990).
21. The Wetlands Exec. OrderNo. 11990, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1978), amended by Exec. OrderNo.
12608, 3 C.F.R. 245 (1988); see also Exec. Order No. 11988, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1988), amended by
Executive Order No. 12148, 3 C.F.R 412 (1990).
22. Robert W. Hahn, Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New
Era from an Old Idea?, 18 Ecology L.Q. 1, 3 (1991).
23. Id.
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Uniform standards are the hallmark of command and control regulations.24
An agency sets out minimum requirements and applies them uniformly to all
regulated parties. Enforcement is accomplished through permitting and sanctions
for violations of issued permits. The Federal Section 404 Permit Program is an
example of command and control regulation.25
The trend in environmental policy is to encourage environmental responsibil-
ity through economic incentive based programs. "We need to encourage people
to take conservation measures and not feel that in doing so they're slitting their
own wrists."26 Incentive theorists believe that the regulating agency should take
into account the relative economic feasibility and reduction capacity of each
polluter and set case by case standards while still meeting an optimal pollution
goal.2'7 Thus, the firm which is able to reduce at a low cost could cut discharges
well below the required level. The amount of environmental benefit from this
reduction is quantified into credits. A credit represents the differencebetween the
standard set by the agency and the actual discharge. The agency then correspond-
ingly transfers the credit from the seller to the purchaser's account. This process
is called credit trading. s The amount of environmental benefit over and above
the standard, the credit, can be sold at a profit. Credit trading programs are in use
with other environmental regulatory programs such as the Clean Air Act.
Only a few economic incentive programs are used in wetlands protection.
The Swampbuster and Wetlands Reserve programs enacted under the Food
Security Act are incentive and disincentive programs for agriculture,29 the other
is mitigation banking which is part of a "tradable permit system."30 These
economic incentive programs encourage landowners to create, restore, or conserve
wetlands on their property by allowing them to make a profit from a land use
choice which promotes conservation. "Since more than seventy percent of all
wetlands are on private lands and since economic considerations drive most land
use decisions," a regulatory approach that offers economic incentives can be more
effective than the traditional command and control regulation.3 This principle
24. Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost-Savings,
23 Envtl. L. 43, 55 (1993).
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, § 1344
(1986, Supp. 1998).
26. Bob Holmes, There's an endangered species on my land!, 33 Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, No. 4,
ISSN: 0028-0402 (1995).
27. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 22, at 7.
28. Bartfeld, supra note 24, at 58.
29. The Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1504 (1985) (codified in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and other places), as amended by the Agriculture Conservation and
Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3587 (1990). The FSA Wetlands Reserve
provisions are codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3862. See also Stewart L. Hofer, Federal Regulation
of Agricultural Drainage Activity in Prairie Potholes: The Effect of Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act and the Swampbuster Provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 511 (1987-1988).
30. Bartfeld, supra note 24, at 57.
3 1. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 22, at 7. See also Dep't of Interior, Wetland Policy, Wetland
Task Force Meetings and Comments Summary, 56 Fed. Reg. 8560, 8565 (1991).
1999]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
goal is achieved with a mitigation bank that provides a profitable land use
choice while promoting the conservation of wetlands and other natural
resources.
Currently, there are no federal laws or regulations governing mitigation
banking. However, the EPA and the Corps have issued internal guidelines
covering the utilization and creation of mitigation banks.32 The guidelines
advise Corps personnel administering the Section 404 permit program, as well
as other agencies with wetland jurisdiction, on the appropriate use of mitigation
bank credits in compensating for wetland damage." These guidelines enunciate
a policy favoring the use of mitigation banking as a tool for meeting the "no net
loss" goal and an option, under appropriate conditions, for mitigation under
permit programs. 34  Regulators support the use of mitigation bank credits as
compensatory mitigation because the success of the mitigation is pre-determined
and the risk of eventual failure is therefore reduced, the higher overall success
rate of banked wetlands over individually created wetlands, and the simplicity of
monitoring one site rather than multiple individual mitigation projects. 3 The
approval is wide spread but the degree of reliance on mitigation banking varies
among states and different agencies. By placing the highest priority on the use
of mitigation bank credits in the 1995 regulations, LDNR has expressed strong
support for mitigation banking.36
Louisiana's Fina La Terre was one of the first private-use mitigation banks
in the nation." The Fina Corporation foresaw the need for future compensatory
mitigation requirements for its oil and gas exploration and production projects.3"
Fina recognized that large wetland areas are less expensive to create and maintain
than are successive individual smaller projects and provided for future mitigation
by creating one large-scale 7,200 acre wetland.39 Serving as a wetland bank,
Fina La Terre sells fresh, intermediate, and brackish marsh credits to other oil
and gas permittees for $50.00 per credit.4° The Entergy Corporation is planning
32. EPA Policy Guidance Document: Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and
Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter EPA Policy
Guidance Document].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Beck, supra note 17.
36. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F) & (E)(l)(a) (1998).
37. Telephone Interview with John Woodard, Surface Manager, Fina La Terre, (March 24,
1997).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Seeking to facilitate more efficient permit processing, usually delayed by the approval
of mitigation conditions, Tenneco, bought out by Fina in 1988, established this wetland bank on land
already owned by the company. Because it was the first such bank in the nation, being established
in 1985 before entrepreneurial banks, the goal was to acquire a tool for facilitating permitting to
break even, not to turn a profit. Fina La Terre's life is 25 years, a figure established by
negotiation between the agencies and the founders prior to the new regulations, which would
have obligated the bank for only 20 years. Given their mission, the fact that the company
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to restore and enhance 1 ,500 acres of saline marsh near Grand Isle.4
Entergy hopes the marsh will serve as a private and public mitigation
bank and from which the company can sell credits for use in the Grand
Isle area. 2
Wetland banks are also created as purely private entrepreneurial
businesses. After agency approval of a bank, the credits may be sold to
developers for a sizable profit. The Wetland Environmental Team's
("WET") project in Georgia is the first example of a strictly entrepreneur-
ial bank. In December of 1992, WET received a permit to restore a 350-
acre hardwood swamp.4 WET purchased a conservation easement from
the Trappist Monks at the Monastery of the Holy Spirit and is planning
to restore this land to its original swamp habitat." The credits are
expensive, six acres worth sold for $90,000. WET estimates that it will
generate about $3 million, with much of the profit going to the monastery
which owns the land.'
Additionally, In August of 1993, the Florida Wetlandsbank firm created
the first commercial, private-public bank, a 345-acre bank which is owned
by the city of Pembroke Pines.4 6  Florida Wetlandsbank leases the
property from the city for $7,000 per acre and in 1995 sold sixty-eight
acres worth of credits to home builders and commercial developers for
approximately $40,000 per acre.47 Pembroke Pines, will receive a restored
wetland, a park with a boardwalk, and picnic areas from the bank as part
of the deal.48
already owned and managed the land, and the mere 25 year obligation, overhead is naturally
low and the value is passed on to their customers, subject to periodic review by the
management, of course.
41. Telephone interview with Randy Williams, Environmental Specialist, Entergy Services, Inc.
(on file with the author). Mr. Williams estimates that the permit for the saline marsh bank will be
granted in early 1998 at which time the phased in bank will have approximately fifty percent of it's
estimated 200-300 credits available for sale at around $10,000 per credit. Because Entergy
is restoring and enhancing the marsh rather than creating it, the credits will not be granted
on a one to one ratio. Under the WVA formula enhanced and restored wetlands create a
lower value per acre than created and functioning wetlands. Thus the ratio of exchange will be closer
to a five to one rate. Thus, for its 1,500 acres effort, Entergy may receive about 300 credits for use
and sale.
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, however, reported that the Entergy bank is still
in the earliest phase of the application process and that there is no indication that the bank
will be approved. Public notice on the bank, the second step in the process, is now
underway.
42. Id.
43. Banking on Wetlands, Planning Magazine, Feb. 1995, at 11-15.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13.
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III. A COMPARISON OF LOUISIANA'S WETLANDS LEGISLATION TO THE
FEDERAL CWA SECTION 404 PROGRAM
A. The Legislative Directive
The State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act ("SLCRMA"),
authorizes the LDNR to regulate activities in the Coastal Zone which have a
direct and significant impact on coastal waters or wetlands. 49  The Coastal
Management Division of the LDNR administers Louisiana's wetland permit
program, the Coastal Use Permit Program ("CUP"), authorized by SLCRMA. 0
Mitigation banking in Louisiana was sanctioned by the legislature in 1990 in
connection with the CUP Program by amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:214.41. This amendment included a mandate that LDNR promulgate
regulations requiring mitigation for CUPs and include rules for the creation and
use of mitigation banks in the Coastal Zone.5'
B. Jurisdictional Differences
A Coastal Zone project requiring a Section 404 permit from the Corps will
also require a state CUP from the LDNR (unless the activity falls into one of the
state exceptions).52 However, there are geographical and technical differences
in the coverage of each program. The state program is broader in relation to
"activities" it covers. The CUP is required for all activities which have "direct
and significant impacts on coastal waters."53 The federal Section 404 permit
is only required for activities involving discharge of dredge or fill material.54
The Corps exempts certain activities related to farming, maintenance, and
activities with minor impacts on wetlands.55 The LDNR exempts similar
49. La. R.S. 49:214.21 (1998); La. R.S. 49:214.25 (1998).
50. Louisiana actually has two separate statutory programs for protecting wetland resources.
The other, the Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Program (CWCRP), authorizes the
implementation of protection, enhancement, and restoration for coastal wetlands through the Coastal
Vegetated Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Plan. The plan is implemented through the
Legislature's annual allocation of money from the trust fund and federal matching funds. La. R.S.
49:213.6-214.1 (1998).
51. La. R.S. 49:214.21 (1998).
52. The Coastal Zone is a geographic limitation on the jurisdiction of the programs. The
Coastal Zone boundary is very particularly defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:214.24. Any
activity proposed to be conducted in the Coastal Zone which is considered to be a "use of concern"
requires a state CUP.
53. La. R.S. 49:214.34(AX2) (Supp. 1998).
54. The Corps interpretation of the phrase "discharge of dredged or fill material" was officially
expanded in 1993 to include activities having the effect of "destroying or degrading" wetlands which
prior to 1993 did not require permitting (i.e. draining). Corps RGL 93-3 (Sept. 13, 1993).
55. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, Section (f) expressly exempts six categories of
activities involving the discharge of dredged or fill material from regulation. These exemptions
correspond to the USDA wetland regulatory programs under the FSA and generally include a) normal
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activities including agriculture, aquaculture, emergency measures, forestry,
recreational hunting and fishing, and maintenance of existing structures, as long
as the activity does not have a "direct and significant impact on coastal
waters.""6  The Louisiana regulations, like the Section 404 single family
housing exemption, allows for the construction of a single family home
without a CUP, but Louisiana also allows a narrow exemption for the
construction of a camp and for minor dredge and fill activity "necessary for the
structure itself and for the installation and maintenance of septic or sewerage
facilities.",
57
The federal program is broader with respect to geographical jurisdiction.
The prohibition against "discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of
the United States," as interpreted, extends to all wetlands.5" The federal
program makes no exceptions. Once an area is designated as a wetland, the
Corps has jurisdiction."S However, the state program exempts wetlands which
are five-feet above mean sea level, and "fastlands,"'6 and is confined to the
statutorily defined Coastal Zone.6'
farming, silviculture, and ranching; b) maintenance activity, including emergency reconstruction of
flood and erosion control structures; c) construction and maintenance of farm ponds or irrigation
ditches; d) construction of temporary sedimentation basins; e) construction or maintenance of farm
roads and temporary mining roads, under best management practices to protect the flow and integrity
of waters and the aquatic environment. A catch-all provision under (0(2) warns that any discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters for the purpose of bringing an area of the waters
into a use to which it was not previously subject, impairing circulation or flow, or reducing the
waters reach, will be required to have a permit.
56. La. RIS. 49:214.34 (1998). The regulatory exemptions are found at Louisiana
Administrative Code 43:1.723(B); Section (B)(2) requires that if any of these excepted activities will
"result in discharges into coastal waters, or significantly change existing water flow into
coastal waters," then the person must notify LDNR, and warns that if any of these activities
do result in "a significant impact on coastal waters, the department may conduct [an]
investigation," and require a CUP if a "direct and significant" impact will result to coastal
waters.
57. La. Admin. Code 43:I.723(B)(4)(b) (1998).
58. Hoffman Homes Inc. v. Administrator, 999 F.2d 256, 262 (1993); Leslie Salt Co. v. United
States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, II1 S. Ct. 1089 (1991); United
States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412, 107 S. Ct.
1831 (1987); United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464, 465 (8th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985);
United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 607 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927,
95 S. Ct. 1124 (1975).
59. Id.
60. "Fastlands" are "lands surrounded by publicly owned, maintained, or otherwise validly
existing levees, or natural formations, as of the effective date of this Subpart or as may be lawfully
constructed in the future, which levees or natural formations would normally prevent activities, not
to include the pumping of water for drainage purposes, within the surrounded area from having direct
and significant impacts on coastal waters." La. R.S. 49:214.23(9) (1998).
61. The Coastal Zone boundary is particularly defined in Louisiana Revised Statues 49:2 14.24.
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C. Louisiana Deviates from the Federal Rules
Both the Louisiana statute and the Federal Guidance incorporate "sequenc-
ing" language into the regulatory definition of "mitigation., 62 The EPA Policy
Guidance Document states that mitigation is "sequentially avoiding impacts,
minimizing impacts, and compensating for remaining unavoidable impacts.,
63
Similarly, Louisiana's statute 214.41(A)(3) defines "mitigation" as '.all actions
taken by a permittee to avoid, minimize, restore, and compensate for ecological
values lost due to permitted activity." Also, the Louisiana statute recognizes all
of the federally recognized forms of "compensatory mitigation," (restoration,
creation, enhancement or preservation).64
However, one should not be misled by the similarities. The EPA Policy
Guidance Document states that "mitigation means sequentially avoiding impacts,
minimizing impacts, and compensating for remaining unavoidable impacts."65
The term "unavoidable" in the quoted text, absent from the Louisiana statute,
references the EPA's "practicable alternatives" test which prohibits permitting
wetland activity if an alternative site, or less damaging alternative method of
construction is available. In fact, the test creates a presumption that a "practica-
ble alternative" does exist for non-water dependent projects. 66 Lacking the term
"unavoidable," the Louisiana statute expresses a relaxed form of the federal
sequencing requirement because it does not require the applicant to exhaust all
alternatives to avoid the damage to a wetland or overcome the non-water
dependent project presumption.6' Additionally, the EPA Policy Guidance
62. EPA Policy Guideline Document, supra note 32; La. R.S. 49:214.41(A)(3) (1998).
63. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32.
64. La. R.S. 49:214.41(A)(1) (1998).
65. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58607.
66. EPA Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines create the "Practicable Alternatives" test. These
Guidelines prohibit permitting the discharge of dredged or fill material if a practicable alternative
exists to the proposed project which would have a less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, as
long as the alternative does not have other significant environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a).
The alternative site or project is "practicable" if it is capable of achieving the developer's purpose,
considering project costs, technical, and logistical factors. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(q). The Guidelines
create a presumption that a practicable alternative does exist for non-water dependent projects
proposed for wetland areas. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3). It is rebutted by showing that a "no less
environmentally harmful alternative" site which is not a wetland is available, or an alternative
construction technique (which does not require a discharge of material into an aquatic site) is
practicable.
67. Under Section 404 compensatory mitigation is defined as "the restoration, creation,
enhancement, or in exceptional circumstances, preservation of wetlands and/or other aquatic
resources for the purpose of compensating for unavoidable adverse impacts" (emphasis added). 26
Envtl. L. Rep. 35632; 60 Fed. Reg. 58605, 58607 (Nov. 28, 1995). Likewise, under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 49:214.41(A)(1) "compensatory mitigation means replacement, substitution,
enhancement, or protection of ecological values to offset anticipated losses of those values caused
by permitted activity."
In addition to the practicable alternatives test, the Section 404 program incorporates the "significant
degradation" analysis. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(4)(c). This is a type of before and after assessment
[Vol. 59
COMMENTS
disfavors "preservation" of existing wetlands.6 However, Louisiana's statute
places "protection" of existing wetlands on equal footing with the other forms
of mitigation.69 The EPA disfavors preservation as a method of wetlands
conservation because preservation usually does not contribute to the "no net loss"
goal.7" With preservation, no new wetland values are gained to offset the loss
caused when wetlands are destroyed by permitted development. The EPA will,
under certain circumstances, accept the preservation of a wetland for mitigation
requirements even if that wetland is threatenedwith an immediate impending risk
of destruction."
Louisiana, however, allows a permittee to mitigate loss by the preservation
of an existing wetland without the threshold requirement that the wetland be
threatened with immediate destruction.72  The Louisiana statute includes
provisions with no counterpart in the federal system. These provisions give the
landowner the right to choose the location of the mitigation project and include
for a variance exception from the required mitigation. 3
IV. THE NEW LOUISIANA REGULATIONS
A. A New Policy
During the notice and comment period, the LDNR stated in a memorandum:
"we all must recognize that the concept of mitigation credit areas will not work
unless the LDNR, state advisory agencies, the Corps, and federal advisory
agencies are in synchrony.... It seems that the LDNR envisioned the
creation of a wetland mitigation program in harmony with the federal and other
state permitting programs. With Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:214.41, the
of the project, including the off-set effect of the implemented mitigation. This determination takes
into account factors including the effect on human health through municipal water supplies, fish,
shellfish, wildlife, and the entire food chain as well as recreational, aesthetic and economic values.
Because the initial permit decision takes into consideration the benefits of the mitigation project, in
order for that assessment to be accurate there should be relative certainty about the success of a
mitigation project. This is one of the reasons mitigation banking is being promoted, it provides more
assurances that the mitigation will actually replace losses because the success of the project is pre-
determined as opposed to an individual project which may or may not, in the end, be successful.
Thus, relying on the developer to insure successful mitigation is more speculative than relying on a
banker because a banker has more experience, a greater investment and is operating under more
stringent regulations and monitoring than the individual project developer.,
68. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58608.
69. La. R.S. 49:214.41(AX1) (1998).
70. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58609.
71. Id.
72. La. R.S. 49:214.41(A)(1) (1998).
73. La. R.S. 49:214.41(C) and (E) (1998).
74. LDNR, Memorandum to commenting parties, at 10 (Nov. 28, 1992) (on file with the
author).
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legislature directed the LDNR to develop and adopt regulations requiring
mitigation for permitted activities in the coastal zone."'
The LDNR's "ultimate goal [in writing the new regulations was] to develop
a mitigation approach that would support long-term wetland conservation efforts
and also complement state, federal, local, and private efforts to conserve
wetlands, while making the permitting process more predictable and eliminating
the unnecessary permitting delays.""6 However, two factors frustrated LDNR's
effort to create the harmonized program envisioned by the drafters: First,
operating under the landowner veto and the variance procedure offered in the
statute significantly limited the LDNR's ability to conform Louisiana's mitigation
priorities to the federal Section 404 program;" second, these regulations are the
product of a three year evolution spanning two different administrations and
included extensive commenting procedures on each of four drafts from several
state advisory agencies, the Corps, federal advisory agencies, landowners,
environmental groups, local governments, development interests, industry, and
the general public.
B. The Old "Band-Aid" Approach
Prior to the drafting of Louisiana's new mitigation and mitigation banking
regulations, Louisiana Administrative Code 43:1.724, the mitigation selection
procedure was inconsistent, sometimes non-existent, and largely discretionary.
"Some of the general permits did not require mitigation .... We were many
times attempting to mitigate for a half acre at this location, [and] half an acre at
that location. We called it a haphazard approach, a kind of band-aid approach to
mitigation."7 One of the ways to combat this inefficient approach was "to
come up with a system where [LDNR] could, either by utilizing mitigation
banks, or by utilizing a monetary formula .... group that mitigation," so that "a
more effective, more long lasting, better for the ecosystem type mitigation"
resulted, instead of "mitigating for each little half acre project" separately in
75. Act 1040, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1990) (enacted) (codified at La. R.S. 49:214.41
(1998)).
76. See LDNR supra note 74, at 2.
77. Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:214.41(C) and (E) contain provisions for a variance
procedure and the landowner veto. See infra text accompanying notes 124-129. Section (C), the
variance provision, allows certain classes of activities to be permitted without requiring mitigation
when the "overriding public interest" of the project outweighs the value of mitigation. Section (E)
grants to a landowner the right to refuse to allow a mitigation project to be placed on his land.
Because this right of refusal effectively grants the power to veto the mitigation project when the
permittee and LDNR, or the Corps, have negotiated an on-site mitigation project, it is referred to as
the "landowner veto."
78. Interview with Quin Kindler, author of La. Admin. Code 43:1.724 (October 31, 1996) (on
file with the author).
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different locations. 9 Additionally, it was uncertain whether the mitigation
required was actually off-setting the loss.
For a lot of the small permits we were not going through the habitat
evaluation procedure where we said you have x number of units of loss
and the mitigation will produce x number of units to off-set [the loss].
It was more like we're loosing a couple of acres over here, we think
that if we put in a plug on an oil and gas canal that would off-set the
loss, or if we put in a water control structure, we think that will off-set
the loss of two acres, without any quantification on either side."0
To address the inconsistencies, a habitat evaluation model was created "that
basically gives the procedure for quantifying the losses and quantifying the
potential gains from mitigation. To a large degree, it was a matter of setting up
an accounting system tallying losses and gains."'" The regulations establish a
standardized procedure, "whereas before, it was 'I think this is good enough,' or
'collectively the agency views this as being sufficient,' and there really was no
standard. It was a weak spot [mitigation requirements] ... in the permitting
process. "82
The type, degree, and cost of compensatory mitigation varied tremendously.
A one acre project right here, and a one acre project [in a different
location], with pretty much the same type of habitat, one [permittee]
was required to plug a well to compensate for that acre, or ten acres of
loss, and on the other permit, it might be to plant 100 or 200 feet of
shoreline, or a mile of shoreline... [when both were] actually causing
the same amount of damage. But, the mitigation that [was] required
may have been vastly different .... in terms of the type, degree, and
how much it cost."3
For an applicant certainty and fairness was the main concern. Applicants were
frustrated with the puzzling discrepanciesbetweenmitigation requirements, which
varied so remarkably between applicants, on substantially similar projects.8 4
The LDNR intended to remedy this inequity by standardizing the procedures."5
The LDNR, the Corps, other agencies, and the applicant each sought a different
procedure and "the mitigation process, determining compensatory mitigation
consume[d] ... 90 percent of the amount of time it took to process the
79. Id.
80. Id.
.81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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permit."86 Thus, the LDNR sought to develop standard procedures, in order to
reduce the amount of overall time it took for a permit to be processed. 7 The
LDNR chose to standardize the procedures by assessing losses and gains in
habitat units. They implemented the Wetland Value Assessment Methodology
(WVA) system to replace all of the ecological values lost, no matter how
small. 8
Two policies predominated, decreasing mitigation-related delays and the
promotion of the use of more effective and efficient mitigation procedures.
However, to reach these goals, the LDNR prioritized the "options" for
compensatory mitigation in the opposite order from the EPA /Corps, despite the
fact that the LDNR recognized early in the drafting process that "reducing
mitigation-related delays can only be accomplished if [the] LDNR, the Corps,
state and federal advisory agencies [together] formulate a reasonable and
structured approach for arriving at acceptable mitigation."89
C. The Creation of a Mitigation Bank
The 1995 LDNR regulations govern the creation and use of mitigation banks
from establishment through the life of the bank, up to fifty years.90 Mitigation
banks are approved and created by a Memorandum of Agreement, a type of
contract between the banker and the agencies. This agreement sets forth the
particulars of the operator's obligations, including what type of wetland he will
create, restore, enhance, or protect, the construction or enhancement plan, the
obligations for maintenance and long term security, etc.91
The process begins by submitting either a proposal or a permit application
which indicates the intent to establish a bank.92 The LDNR then determines the
acceptability and appropriateness of establishing the bank according to specific
factors.93 Approval procedures are extensive and involve interaction with the
Corps, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and other commenting agencies at every
level of the process.94 Processing and review fees are assessed along the way.
The regulations set up a tiered approach to classification of mitigation banks.
There are corresponding requirements for security and long term maintenance
that differ for each class.95 The classification system is based on what scientists
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See LDNR, supra note 74, at 14.
90. La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(F)(2)(b) (1998).
91. La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(F)(4)(j) (1998).
92. La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(F)(4) (1998).
93. These include the operator's history with environmental compliance, his ability to operate
and maintain a bank, the proposed bank's potential environmental benefits, and its consistency with
other wetland protection or enhancement programs. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(2) (1998).
94. La. Admin. Code 43:l.724(F)(5)(d) (1998).
95. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7) (1998).
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know about the success rates of created or restored wetlands of different types.
The greater the success rate of a particular type of habitat, the lower the risk of
failure. For instance, a hardwood swamp bank is considered one of the lowest
risk banks because the habitat is vigorous, once established it requires no
maintenance and is virtually perpetual. The regulations correlate monetary
security, legal security, and credit freedom with the risk factor associated with
each classification of bank.96 Critics of mitigation banking warn of the
potential for sham banks where "after all the credits are sold, the entrepreneurs
who create the mitigation banks will simply move on to the next project,
ignoring the question of ongoing maintenance."97 In such a case, responsibili-
ties for ongoing maintenance and monitoring to keep the wetland alive years
after the profit has been absorbed would fall on the tax payers. This concern is
more relevant to the type of bank allowed to sell credits up front, before the
wetland is established and functioning. Other widely debated concerns include
the method of valuing wetlands destroyed, the quantification of credits, and the
ratio of exchange. 9 Some advocate a one to one ratio; one unit of value is
established as replacement for one destroyed.99  Others, acknowledging the
speculation inherent in valuing wetlands, advocate a higher exchange such as a
two to one, or three to one exchange, leaving room for error. °0 A more
fundamental debate continues on whether functioning wetlands can even be
created that actually replace any true functions of natural wetlands. Another
concern is whether the regular reliance on mitigation bank credits would
concentrate wetland habitats in certain smaller areas while depleting them in
others, harming the wildlife dependent on the widely dispersed wetlands.'
The first category is the "phased-in" type of bank. This is actually the
intermediate risk classification but requires no monetary security.'0 2 However,
it is subject to the legal security of a conservation servitude.'0 3  The LDNR
96. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F) (1998).
97. Banking on Wetlands, supra note 43.
98. Bartfeld, supra note 24.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Banking on Wetlands, supra note 43, at 11-15.
102. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(FX7) (1998).
103. The EPA Guidance on Mitigation Banking requires safeguards for the approval of a bank
which include a conservation easement for "perpetuity," deed transfer, or deed restriction. Louisiana,
by contrast, only requires a twenty year servitude for marsh banks and a fifty year servitude for
forested banks.
In Louisiana, there is a public policy against tying up land for long periods of time. Thus the
Section 404 MOA, or contract by which the banker is obligated to a negative servitude on his
property forever, could be subject to the challenge of "unlawful cause." In such a case, after the
credits are expended and the banker finds a more profitable use for the land, he can simply allow the
servitude to prescribe for nonuse, or breach the MOA with the defense that it is void as against
public policy.
It is unclear whether a negative servitude will begin to prescribe by nonuse with only one act
inconsistent with the servitude, or if it requires multiple acts to commence the running of
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will release credits to this banker for sale incrementally over the life of the
project based on periodic reviews of the habitat.10 4
The second classification is the "low risk" bank. With these banks, one
hundred percent of the credits are released for sale when the bank becomes
"operational." The monetary security is required for only five years, and the
standard conservation servitude protects the area for the life of the bank.'0 5
Banks in this category do not require maintenance or operation and involve
habitat types, like hardwood swamps, with proven success rates.0 6
The third is the "high risk" category, intended to address fragile marshlands
and allowing the release of only twenty-five percent of the credits in the first two
years of operation. The remaining seventy-five percent of the credits will be
released in the third year of operation, after review for functioning.0 7 The
security for this category is more demanding than the other two. It requires a
cash or surety bond in an amount sufficient to cover any maintenance or
remediation over the life of the bank. °s Additionally, along with the standard
conservation servitude, the banker choosing this category must provide for a
mechanism by which the LDNR will have the legal authority to take over the
bank in the event that the banker fails to uphold his end of the Memorandum of
Agreement.0 9
D. Mitigation Bank Credits
1. Quantification of Credits and Debits
Determining the "functional value" of a wetland is a daunting task. Because
there are different assessment techniques employed by different experts,
controversy over which of these assessments is the best is likely and a lack of
uniformity certain."0 In Louisiana, the regulations require the application of
the Wetland Value Assessment Methodology, or "WVA," formula."' In
adopting this particular formula, the LDNR found it to be "user-friendly.""'
Commentators from the conservation groups found the formula inadequate for
the same reason the LDNR found it superior.
The LDNR selected the WVA because the formula relies on three factors it
considers most relevant in wetlands assessment, vegetated wetlands, and habitat
prescription. Because the conservation servitude has not been challenged in the courts, it is hard to
assess the quality of legal security that the servitude offers. La. R.S. 9:1271-1276 (1998).
104. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7)(a)(i) (1998).
105. La. Admin. Code 43:l.724(FX7)(a)(ii) (1998).
106. Id.
107. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7)(a)(iii) (1998).
108. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7)(c) (1998).
109. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7)(aXiii) (1998).
110. Albrecht, supra note 19, at 266.
111. La. Admin. Code 43:1:724(C) (1998).
112. See LDNR, supra note 74, at 6.
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of fish and wildlife communities." 3 However, because it does not consider
other functions, such as flood control values, sedimentation, ground water
recharging, etc., the conservation groups found it inadequate." 4 The LDNR and
the Corps operate under the assumption that if the wetland appears to be
functioning in the major three areas, vegetation, fish, and wildlife, this is
indicative of the health of all other functions."' Because the legislation
authorizing the regulations only mandates consideration of the three factors,
vegetative, fish, and wildlife functions, the LDNR met its mandate in selecting this
formula.
2. Use of Mitigation Bank Credits
The regulations allow CUP permittees to use mitigation bank credits as
compensatory mitigation when the LDNR is provided with written evidence that
credits have been purchased from an approved mitigation bank. "6 A mitigation
bank is approved once the following conditions have been met: 1) The mitigation
bank operator has paid his establishment fee; 2) The MOA, binding the operator
to a plan of creation and establishment, maintenance obligations, and long term
security obligations, has been signed by the agencies and the operator; 3) the
operator has provided evidence that his security requirements have been met; 4)
the construction and operation measures creating the wetland bank contained in the
MOA have been fully implemented, (or at least the initial phases of the measures
have been implemented, if the bank is to be the phased-in type of bank)." 7
The LDNR will keep a running balance of total credits for each mitigation
bank."8  Each time a permit applicant purchases credits for mitigation the
agency will correspondingly reduce the credits available from the bank by that
amount." 9 Credits are only acceptable for permit projects occurring within the
territorial "boundary" of the bank, a geographical operating limit set by the agency
in the MOA. 120 In addition, a permit applicant must purchase bank credits
which comply with Section J of the new regulations, "Selecting Compensatory
Mitigation." This requires the LDNR to "ensure that the selected compensatory
mitigation, in order of priority, [mitigation bank credit, individual project, and
then monetary contribution]," is "sufficient" (of equivalent habitat value under
WVA), "properly located," and "accomplished by the most desirable avail-
able/practicable option. ' '121
113. Id.; La. Admin. Code 43:I:724(C) (1998).
114. See LDNR, supra note 74, at 3.
115. Interview with Quin Kindler, supra note 78.
116. La. Admin. Code 43:l.724(F)(I1)(b) (1998).
117. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(I 1Xa)(i)-(iv) (1998).
118. La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(F)(IIXf) (1998).
119. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(I l(gXii) (1998).
120. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(1 1)(c)-(h) (1998).
121. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(JX2)-(4) (1998).
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V. INCOMPATIBILITY
-The new regulations were intended to address the "shortcomings" of the
prior mitigation system.'22 Although the LDNR may have successfully
addressed some of the inadequacies in the prior Louisiana mitigation analysis,
one unfortunate consequence is the widening of the gap between the Louisiana
and the federal wetland permit programs. Because the systems overlap, most
developers in the Coastal Zone must have both a Louisiana CUP and a Corps
404 permit to conduct any activity in a Louisiana wetland.'23 The potential
consequences of incompatible overlapping systems range from permit or
project delays and duplicative mitigation to the permanent loss of wetland habitat
within a basin, with cumulative detrimental effects on the entire coastal
ecosystem.
A. Problems Created by Statute
The Louisiana mitigation statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:214.41,
includes two separate provisions, Sections (C) and (E), with no counterpart in the
federal program. Section C provides for a variance procedure exempting certain
activities from mitigation requirements. Section E grants to a landowner the
right to refuse a mitigation project on his land.
1. Section E: The Landowner "Veto" Provision
This provision is referred to as the landowner "veto" because it grants a
landowner the right to reject a compensatory mitigation project on his land even
if the LDNR, or the Corps, has approved an on-site project as a permit condition.
Section E states:
The owner of the land on which a permitted activity is to occur shall
have the option of requiring on-site or off-site compensatory mitigation
on his property, notwithstanding any geographical limitation otherwise
required by the regulations adopted by the secretary, provided that the
secretary determines that the proposed mitigation is acceptable and
sufficient."24
The landowner, by the express language of the statute, may reject the placement
of the mitigation project on his land and force the project to be placed elsewhere,
even though state and federal agency regulations would otherwise require such
122. See LDNR, supra note 74, at 1.
123. Developers will also need a state water quality permit in most instances. However,
discussion of Louisiana's water quality control law and permit process is outside the scope of this
paper.
124. La. R.S. 49:214.41(E) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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a creation to be on-site, or at least within the same basin. 2 It is common in
south Louisiana for the permit applicant to be a lessee rather than the landowner.
When this is the situation, a landowner may be unwilling to allow the permittee
to burden his land with the mitigation project, most likely due to the ongoing
conservation responsibilities which would then restrict future use of the land. 26
In that instance, there may be no other available land, within the same basin,'27
to conduct the required mitigation project.
The only check on the landowner's power of placement is the last phrase of
Section E, which allows the veto "provided that the secretary determines that the
proposed mitigation is acceptable and sufficient." 2 ' Notice that the legislature
did not include any directive that the secretary approve the "placement" or
"location" of the mitigation. The statute only requires that the LDNR approve
the type of measure, (i.e. the creation of five acres of saline marsh). Neither
does the statutory definition of "mitigation" include considerations of location or
proper "placement."' 2 9 Thus, if the LDNR approves the "mitigation" method,
for example, a five acre saline marsh, the placement of that marsh is subject to
the veto of the landowner despite the needs of the particular ecosystem which
may require that wetland functions be replaced where they were lost.
2. The Variance Provision
The statute authorizes the granting of variances for compensatory mitigation
when an activity has a "clearly overriding public interest" and performing
mitigation would make the project "impracticable."' 3 In Louisiana Revised
Statutes 49:214 section A(4), "overriding public interest" is defined:
125. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32. The regulatory requirement that
replacement wetlands be within the same basin, or watershed, is founded in scientific proof of the
negative effects of off-setting the natural ratio of wetland to upland areas in a given geographical
area. Flood water control, water quality controls, wildlife habitat, ground water recharging, and other
vital functions are lost to the area when the wetland is destroyed with potentially dangerous effects.
The same is true in reverse; when wetlands are created in areas where they do not naturally occur,
the projects often fail, and nature's balance is upset with detrimental consequences for that
ecosystem.
126. A created, restored, enhanced, or preserved wetland mitigation project requires a
conservation servitude and ongoing maintenance responsibilities. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(7)
(1998).
127. Louisiana has nine drainage basins, equivalent to a watershed, which contain an
interconnected system of wetlands. Scientific evidence has shown that these wetlands are
functionally important parts of the overall drainage system in each basin. The Corps and the LDNR
prefer to replace the wetlands lost in each basin, so that the replaced values are as geographically
close to the original site as possible and no important functions are lost to the basin.
128. La. R.S. 49:214.41(E) (Supp. 1998).
129. La. R.S. 49:214.41(AX3) (Supp. 1998): Mitigation means "all actions taken by a permittee
to avoid, minimize, restore, and compensate for ecological values lost due to a permitted activity."
130. La. R.S. 49:214.41(C) (Supp. 1998).
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Overriding public interest means that the public interest benefits of a
given activity clearly outweigh the public interest benefits of compensat-
ing for wetland values lost as a result of the activity, as in the case of
certain mineral extraction, production and transportation activities or
construction of flood protection facilities critical for protection of
existing infrastructure. 3 '
This illustrative list is dangerous because it could be interpreted broadly to
include any activities of oil and gas industry service providers and could be
extended beyond just the oil and gas extraction and transportation permittees.
The language of the statute could allow other permittees involved in any type of
mineral extraction, energy providing service or similar public service to claim
unmitigated wetland losses.
The volume of oil and gas extraction activities impacting wetlands is already
high. If the variance provision were interpreted expansively to include related
industry activities, the variance exception could swallow the mitigation rule.
Even under the narrowest interpretation, allowing the oil and gas industry to
conduct extraction, production, and transportation activities without being
responsible for mitigation, would remove from the mitigation process some of
Louisiana's most troublesome subjects. Oil and gas industry activity is one of
the most costly industries for coastal wetlands. In order to conduct exploration,
extraction, and transportation of oil and gas in a wetland, wide pathways must
be cut to allow rigs and barges to maneuver. This activity is usually done under
a permit where the LDNR decides the least harmful route and demands
mitigation for the remaining impacts. However, every time this activity is
permitted some damage is done to the habitat whether it be from the saltwater
intrusion caused by opening canals, killing the vegetation, fish, and wildlife, or
from the resulting erosion caused'by the loss of vegetation and altered waterflow.
If anything, these activities should be restricted if Louisiana is to save the
remaining wetlands and rebuild those that have been lost. New Orleans District
Corp Commander Colonel William L. Conner says that dredging of navigation
and oil field access canals, wave and boat erosion and the leveeing of the
Mississippi River are the main causes of marsh loss in Louisiana.'32
"Louisiana's wetlands losses are blamed on a variety of causes, but two of the
biggest culprits, experts say, are canal-building for navigation and oil-and-gas
exploration purposes, and a rapid rise in sea level along the coast."'' 33
131. La. R.S. 49:214(A)(4) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
132. William L. Conner, Finding Solutions. Not Theories, For Wetlands Loss, the New Orleans
Times-Picayune, July 10, 1997, at B6.
133. The sinking of wetlands soils resulting from both natural causes and the extraction of oil,
gas and other minerals exacerbate the problems caused with sea level rise. Wetlands Losses are
Down, But Not Over, supra note 5, at A18.
Such problems may only get worse because scientists studying global warming predict that the
oceans may rise up to three feet as greenhouse gasses cause the climate to change. If this does occur,
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B. LDNR Regulatory Additions
The LDNR somewhat diminished the danger of the variance exception by
adding a public notice procedure into the regulations. 34  By adding the
safeguard of a public hearing to the notice of reasons required by the statute, the
drafters ensured that the discretionary decision to grant a variance would at least
be subject to community comment. Additionally, in response to the "landowner
veto" provision in the statute, the LDNR incorporated into the new regulations
a pre-existing option. The monetary contribution can be used in lieu of an
individual project if a landowner exercises his veto power.
1. The Monetary Contribution Option
As a flexible option, the LDNR may accept monetary contributions in lieu
of an implemented mitigation project.'" However, as beneficial as this may
be to the LDNR, because the federal program does not take such a flexible
approach, the permittee may end up with duplicative mitigation requirements.
For example, to receive a CUP permit, a permittee could contribute money to the
LDNR as mitigation (because the landowner vetoed his on-site project and there
are no in-kind mitigation bank credits available). However, he may still be
required to perform an individual mitigation project elsewhere for the Corps
under Section 404. It is unclear if the Corps' policies would be flexible enough
to accept a project implemented some time later by the LDNR with the
permittee's monetary contribution as current compensatory mitigation for the
Section 404 permit.
The Corps would apply the "in-lieu-fee mitigation arrangements"procedures
found in the federal guidlines to determine if the monetary contribution would
satisfy the EPA compensatory mitigation requirements. 3" This provision states
that arrangements "wherein funds are paid to a natural resource management
entity for implementation of either specific or general wetland. . . development
projects ... do not typically provide ... a clear timetable for the initiation of
mitigation efforts."' 37 Even though the Corps would attempt to avoid imposing
duplicative mitigation on a permittee, the Corps may only consider the
permittee's mitigation responsibilities satisfied by the monetary contribution to
the LDNR if it finds that the arrangement "meet[s] the requirements that would
otherwise apply to an offsite, prospective mitigation effort and provides adequate
Louisiana's coast could be eliminated and the marshlands where fish, shrimp and other Gulf Coast
seafood spawn could disappear into the Gulf. The Associated Press, Global Warming Meeting Turns
up Heat on Louisiana, supra note 4, at A6.
134. La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(KX3Xc)-(4) (1998).
135. La. Admin. Code 43:l.724(E)(IXd) (1998).
136. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58613.
137. Id.
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assurances of success and timely implementation."'3 Additionally, "a formal
agreement between the sponsor and the agencies, similar to a banking instrument,
is necessary to define the conditions under which its use is considered appropri-
ate."'3 The state could become obligated for the private developer's mitiga-
tion under the Corps' "in lieu fee arrangements" analysis. Therefore, by
allowing the developer to make a monetary contribution to the LDNR as
mitigation, the LDNR, in effect, may be accepting the permittees legal
responsibility to the Corps for compensatory mitigation on a project. It is risky
for a state public agency to substitute itself for a private developer in a legal
obligation to the corps.
The ultimate result of these differing provisions is uncertainty for the
permittee, project delays, a risk of duplicative mitigation, delayed mitigation
implementation, and possibly a denial of a permit. Thus, the landowner in effect
has the statutory right to delay, if not to totally veto, an entire project. The
permittee will not be allowed to conduct the activity he plans if the Corps refuses
to grant the Section 404 permit even if the LDNR has granted the CUP permit,
because both permits are necessary.
2. Additional Procedural Requirements for Variances
The Corps and the EPA guidelines do not allow for variances and creates a
risk that a variance will be granted under the CUP but the permittee will still
have to mitigate under Section 404. The necessity of the variance provision is
dubious, considering that the federal system lacks such a procedure. In other
words, if the EPA and the Corps do not envision a project with such overwhelm-
ing public interest that it is worth unmitigated wetland loss, should Louisiana?
In light of the absence of such an allowance in the federal program, and the
unclear policies which motivated the Louisiana Legislature to include the
variance exception in the statute, maybe this portion of the statute should be
separately repealed. One of the first drafts of the statute did not allow any
exception to the mitigation requirement. 40 It expressly stated that "[i]n no
case shall compensatory mitigation, at a level sufficient to replace the ecological
values of the wetlands lost as a result of the permitted activity, be considered
infeasible."'' Why the final statute compromised the strict requirement is
unclear.'42
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. H.B. 1760, 1990 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1990).
141. Id.
142. One assumption is that the oil and gas lobby in the state legislature is responsible for this
provision. It could not have been in the Corps because the Corps has authority of its own under the
Rivers and Harbors Act to dredge or fill as is necessary to maintain the waterways in a navigable
condition and to maintain levee systems.
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Since Louisiana has the monetary contribution option, it would seem that
there should not be an instance when mitigation measures would render a project
impracticable.'43 If it is impracticable for a developer to create a wetland to
replace the one he is impacting, he can simply make a contribution to the LDNR
and the agency will create one elsewhere. It has become as easy as "pay to the
order of' to secure a permit in Louisiana. This regulatory option obviates the
need for the variance procedure.
On the other hand, the variance procedure can be seen as a limitation on the
discretion of the secretary. In order to allow a permittee to go without
completely mitigating for losses, he must go through the variance procedure. If
nothing else, the procedures will make getting out of mitigation a publicly
scrutinized event and improve the LDNR's accountability for the exception.
3. Incentives for Mitigation Banking
a. Section 404
Mitigation banking has some proven benefits which are worth encourag-
ing,'" however, the concept is relatively new. Accordingly, the EPA and
Corps have proceeded with caution 45 in encouraging mitigation banking by
143. "Impracticability" is decided by balancing the economic, practical, and technical aspects
of a proposed project. For instance, if an area is geographically inappropriate for an on-site
mitigation project, if the construction or maintenance of a project would be economically or
technically infeasible, or if the length of time to complete a project is an issue, instead of granting
a variance due to the impracticability of mitigation, the secretary can accept a monetary contribution
as mitigation. Thus, if mitigation bank credits and an individual mitigation project are both
unavailable or impracticable, the monetary contribution is available.
144. The benefits of banking include pre-destruction replacement, the contract or banking
instrument ensures monitoring and long term liability, and locating all mitigation for an area in one
location saves agency resources and personnel field time for monitoring projects. With a bank, an
agency may check on the functioning of one site and ensure that a multitude of permittees mitigation
projects are functioning. Without a bank, each permittee has a separate project in a separate location
and monitoring all of these little projects can be a personnel and resources nightmare for an agency.
Interview with Quin Kindler, supra note 78.
145. Critics of mitigation banking warn of the potential for sham banks that "after all the credits
are sold, the entrepreneurs who create the mitigation banks will simply move on to the next project,
ignoring the question of ongoing maintenance." Banking on Wetlands, supra note 43. In such a
case, responsibilities for ongoing maintenance and monitoring to keep the wetland alive years after
the profit has been absorbed would fall on the tax payers. This concern is more relevant to the type
of bank allowed to sell credits up front, before the wetland is established and functioning. Other
widely debated concerns include the method of valuing wetlands destroyed, the quantification of
credits, and the ratio of exchange. Some advocate a one to one ratio, one unit of value is established
as replacement for one destroyed. Others, acknowledging the speculation inherent in valuing
wetlands, advocate a higher exchange such as a two or three credits or units to one exchange, leaving
room for error. More fundamentally debated is the issue of whether functioning wetlands can even
be created in a way which actually replaces any true functions of natural wetlands. Another concern
is whether the regular reliance on mitigation bank credits would concentrate wetland habitats in
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allowing the use of wetland bank credits only after strict sequencing. 46
Sequencing emphasizes the conservation of the natural conditions or re-creation
of those conditions at the site where they were lost. This goal is further
expressed by the preference for on-site, in-kind mitigation. The EPA guidance
accepts bank credits only "when on-site compensation is either not practicable or
use of a mitigation bank is environmentally preferable to on-site compensa-
tion."'14 7 In other words, the federal agencies' goals are to preserve the habitat
and functions on the site itself and to restore the functions to that watershed.
However, if a developer cannot practicably restore the same kind of habitat
and functions in the same place they are destroyed then the EPA methodically
seeks the most environmentally beneficial option.
In choosing between on-site mitigation and use of a mitigation bank,
careful consideration should be given to the likelihood for successfully
establishing the desired habitat type, the compatibility of the mitigation
project with the adjacent land uses, and the practicability of long-term
monitoring and maintenance to determine whether the effort will be
ecologically sustainable, as well as the relative cost of mitigation
alternatives. 48
If several small areas will be destroyed, as with a linear project, or if the impact
is de minimus, as with a nationwide permit, "use of a mitigation bank to
compensate.., is preferable to on-site mitigation."' 49 For the developer who
cannot mitigate on-site, the Corps prefers a credit purchase, from a mitigation
bank that is located in the same watershed as the permit site, over an individual
off-site project. Circumstances may warrant a combination of on-site and off-site
mitigation projects to compensate for the values lost.'
b. Louisiana CUP
Louisiana encourages banking with less caution than the EPA and Corps.
The new regulations offer three categories of compensatory mitigation options
to a permittee with different and more flexible requirements.' 5 ' The LDNR
prefers the purchase of mitigation bank credits, then individual mitigation
projects, and finally, monetary contributions.'52 Because of the potential for
certain smaller areas while depleting them in others, harming the wildlife dependent on the widely
dispersed wetlands. Id. However, the EPA and LDNR have addressed most of these issues in the
Guidance on Mitigation Banking, and with the Louisiana regulations on mitigation banking.
146. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58607.
147. 60 Fed. Reg. 58605, 58607.
148. 60 Fed. Reg. 58605, 58611.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(E) (1998).
152. Id.
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a landowner veto, it may be impossible or impracticable to restore wetland values
on-site.'s' The procedure for selecting compensatory mitigation also places
limitations on the site selection process.'54
The procedure requires the LDNR to "ensure that the selected compensatory
mitigation, in order of priority" is "sufficient (of equivalent habitat value under
the WVA)," "properly located," and "accomplished by the most desirable avail-
able/practicable option.""' The most favored option then is the purchase of
in-kind credits from a "properly located" bank. 56 To be properly located, the
bank must have "an anticipatedpositive impact" on the Coastal Zone, "be on-site
if the opportunity exists," and "contribute" to the health of the basin.' These
guiding factors are broad, vague, and too poorly defined to provide objective
criteria for selecting mitigation, especially if compared to the precise and
comprehensive language used by the EPA to enumerate which factors should be
relied upon for selecting mitigation.
Combining the choices for mitigation with these guiding factors, the LDNR's
preferred option is unrealistic-the use of mitigation bank credits from a bank
located on the landowner's property which is itself the site of the permitted
activity. It is hard to believe this situation would occur very often, as it seems
that a permittee would rarely be developing on the property of a mitigation bank.
Because Louisiana's coast is mostly private land and a great deal of permits are
issued to oil and gas company-lessees, the permittee will commonly not be the
landowner. If the landowner is not also a wetland banker, and does not want
mitigation on his property then the LDNR will prefer the permittee to mitigate
by off-site mitigation bank credit purchase.' This option will also see little
use due to the limited access to mitigation banks and the limited amounts and
kinds of credits available. 59
153. Id.
154. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(J) (1998).
155. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(J)(2) (1998).
156. Id.
157. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(J)(4) (1998).
158. See La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(E) (1998).
159. The Entergy Corporation has begun the process of restoring and enhancing a 1,500 acre
saline marsh which it hopes will be approved as a mitigation bank. See supra note 41. The marsh
is near Grand Isle and Entergy hopes to be offering credits for sale next year. Id. Currently though,
only Fina La Terre is offering credits for sale. In the Coastal Zone there are a wide variety of
wetland types, each ideally requiring in-kind replacement, yet only three types of marsh wetlands
have replacement credits in stock. Fina La Terre supplies fresh, intermediate, and brackish marsh
credits and has already expended a third of the total credits available. Interview with John Woodard,
supra note 37. Fina La Terre's 7,200 acres are divided between fresh, intermediate, and brackish
marsh and its service area is confined to a certain geographical boundary. The boundary for Fina
La Terre is Hydrological unit 5, an area between Bayou Lafourche and the Atehafalaya. The Entergy
bank, if ever approved, will offer only a limited number of salt water marsh credits that will also be
confined to sales within its geographical boundary. See La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(1 l)(g) (1998).
However, in the Coastal Zone there are 2,516,249.70 total acres of marshland, 945,571.92 of which
are fresh, 490,250.02 are saline, 369,210.73 intermediate, and 754,537.61 acres of brackish marsh.
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Relaxing sequencing requirements could create a broader market for
entrepreneurialbanks by allowing a more flexible approach to the permit process.
The flexibility could promote the Louisiana policy of "establish[ing] a proper
balance" between industry or developer interests and the conservation of
industry-dependent natural resources."' By relaxing sequencing requirements,
Louisiana would open the market to off-site mitigation services and create a
better market for entrepreneurial banks. Relaxing sequencing and prioritizing the
use of banks could foster the mitigation banking business, and therefore meet one
goal of the new regulations. 6' Thus, in theory, Louisiana has created an
economic incentive for a market-driven private conservation effort to supplement
the agency regulatory command-and-control approach. Under these regulations,
a new wetlands regulatory environment may result, fostering the mitigation
banking industry.
However, several obstacles remain which deter the development of a
mitigation banking industry in Louisiana, even though the mitigation regulations
have created an incentive for mitigation bank use. One such hurdle is the rate
of subsidence of the Louisiana coast line. Currently, Louisiana's coastal marshes
are disappearing at a rate of thirty-five square miles per year.'62 A long-term
investment in a wetland creation or restoration that may just wash away is a
risky proposition. Additionally, the geography of the Louisiana coast is well-
suited for marshlands and ill-suited for bottomland hardwood swamps; hardwood
swamps are the most successful type of mitigation bank. They are relatively
low-risk investments with a high rate of return. They require little or no
maintenance and once established are virtually perpetual. Marshland banks cost
more to implement and require continuing maintenance. The life of a marshland
LDNR, Habitat Data for Coastal Louisiana (1993). In light of these figures, Fina La Terre's 7,200
acres is only enough to mitigate for less than .00286% of the total. Because Entergy merely plans
to restore and enhance an existing saline marsh, a resulting bank will not be allowed to use a full
acre per acre credit ratio; consequently, a potential 1,500 acre bank may only hold 300 credits, only
a portion of which will be offered to the public to mitigate for saline marsh permits. In addition to
marshland acres, the Coastal Zone supports 1,318,497.40 acres of forested wetlands with no
replacement credits available. Id. Fina La Terre credits will only be acceptable for a tiny percent
of all coastal zone wetlands and the Entergy bank's credits, if ever available, will only be suitable
for saline marsh replacement values. See supra note 41. This leaves permittees impacting all other
wetland types in the coastal zone relegated to either individual projects, wetland areas, or a monetary
contribution as compensatory mitigation. See La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(J)(5) (1998). With the
regulatory preference for the purchase of mitigation bank credits, Louisiana needs more mitigation
banks.
160. "The state must act immediately to conserve, restore, create, and enhance vegetated
wetlands in coastal Louisiana while encouraging use of coastal resources and recognizing that it is
in the public interest of the people of Louisiana to establish a responsible balance between
development and conservation. Management of renewable coastal resources must proceed in a
manner that is consistent with and complementary to the efforts to establish a proper balance between
development and conservation." La. R.S. 49:213.1 .C (Statement of intent) (Supp. 1998).
161. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(F)(1) (1998)
162. See Louisiana's Policy, supra note 11.
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is shorter and it is somewhat fragile in comparison to a hardwood bank. Thus,
because the coastal zone is well-suited to the least profitable type of bank and
ill-suited to the most profitable type of bank, it is less likely that entrepreneurs
will take the risk of investing in mitigation banks in the coastal zone, despite the
regulatory inducement.
4. The Risk of the "Buy-a-Permit" System
With an emphasis on restoration of the wetland on-site, the Corps "practica-
ble alternatives test" ensures strict adherence to sequencing and allows the use
of mitigation bank credits only if the on-site project is impracticable or the
mitigation bank credits are environmentally preferable.' 63 However, there is
a caveat from the EPA: "[i]t is important to emphasize that applicants should
not expect that establishment of, or purchasing credits from, a mitigation bank
will necessarily lead to a determination of compliance with applicable mitigation
requirements, ... or as excepting projects from any applicable require-
ments."'" Under Section 404 rules, an applicant must use all means available
to avoid all impacts to wetlands, and after the Corps is satisfied that no
practicable alternative exists, the Corps will consider mitigation for unavoidable
impacts.' This strict sequencing approach is a safeguard against the undesir-
able effect that mitigation conditions could overly influence the permit process;
a risk that relaxation of sequencing requirements could create.
The risk created by relaxed sequencing is that the proposed project may be
considered in light of mitigation plans involving either the advance purchase of
mitigation bank credits or an advance monetary contribution to the LDNR. That
risk may mean that a permittee will be able to "purchase a permit," allowing
destruction of a wetland without the environmental impacts being in fact timely
and/or fully mitigated. This circumstance seems paradoxical. The goal of the
regulations is to streamline the process and ensure that losses are compensated
for in actual wetland value replacement. 66 Because mitigation banking was
the most attractive option in light of these concerns, it was given preferential
treatment in the regulations.'67 One of the greatest advantages of mitigation
banking is that the mitigation is in place prior to construction. This ensures
actual replacement and prevents a temporal loss of habitat from occurring. A
time lag in replacing the habitat can be detrimental to the overall watershed
health. Because flood control, rare and endangered species habitat, water quality
controls, and other functions are lost when the permitted activity takes place, if
the compensating mitigation is not done previous to, or concurrent with, the
destruction, these values are lost for some period of time. However, due to the
163. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58607.
164. Id. at 58611.
165. Id. at 58607.
166. See Interview with Quin Kindler, supra note 78.
167. Id.
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situation in Louisiana, the theoretical benefit of prioritizing the use of mitigation
banks may produce the opposite result.
When these regulations are applied to a permittee destroying saline marsh
acres in Louisiana, he has no bank to purchase credit from, and if an individual
project is vetoed or impracticable, a monetary contribution would be the most
efficient, and likely the favored option. However, because the regulations do not
place a time frame, or other limitation, on the LDNR creation of the actual
mitigation project, the monetary contribution option, could produce temporal
habitat and watershed function loss and may not satisfy the Corps' "in lieu fee
arrangement" procedures. After money has been accepted, the regulations do not
ensure that the habitat will be replaced at all, much less replaced timely and
within the same basin. It is certainly possible, if not likely, that the contribution
will be used to further the overall coastal restoration plan with little consideration
of the particular site that was destroyed for which the money was contributed.
The ease of the monetary contribution option, used by the LDNR for
years, 68 does create a risk that monetary contributions, more than the credit
purchase option, will unduly influence the permit approval process, especially
considering that the final regulations are without limiting provisions. 69 The
failure of the regulations to address safeguards ensuring the dedication of funds
to specific projects creates a reasonable expectation of some deficiencies,
particularly in the area of temporal habitat loss.
Specifically, the regulations in Section 724(I)(21) direct the secretary to
select a project for the use of the funds contributed after the comments of
interested agencies are received, and then use that money to implement the
selected measure. 7 This provision does not state that the particular site, the
same basin, or even the same kind of wetland is even a factor to be considered.
It neither addresses the temporal habitat loss issue, nor limits the secretary's
discretion. For instance, it does not indicate whether the money can be pooled
to create a larger cumulative project, whether the contribution may be used to
support the overall coastal restoration plan, or whether the selection procedures
from Section 724(J) also apply to the secretary's selection of a project.'
Considering that the LDNR included the monetary contribution option as a way
to "group" smaller projects and make monitoring more efficient, the intent must
have been to allow the secretary to pool the contributions and begin large
168. Prior to the adoption of these regulations the LDNR accepted monetary contributions
regularly as mitigation, often from oil and gas industry permittees. Examples from an LDNR
memorandum dated September 11, 1992 include $172,975.00 worth of contributions on seven
different projects. Memorandum on Mitigation funds donated to CRD/CRD approved projects (Sept.
1I, 1992) (on file with the author).
169. See La. Admin. Code 43:I.724(1X21) (1998).
170. La. Admin. Code 43:1.724(1)(21) (1998). "[T]he secretary shall select a specific wetland
creation, restoration, protection, and or enhancement measure to be implemented with that money."
171. Louisiana Administrative Code 43:1.724(J) requires the secretary to ensure the mitigation
is in order of priority, properly located, and is practicable. See supra note 142 and accompanying
text.
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projects, or establish wetland "areas," once enough money is collected.'72
Grouping may involve considerable delay, increasing the temporal habitat loss
and could take some projects out of the basin. The regulation should include a
more specific set of procedures declaring the LDNR duty and discretion.
VI. IMPLEMENTING THE 1995 REGULATIONS
Under Section 404, the Corps must require an on-site mitigation project
when practicable.' In Louisiana, if the landowner exercises his veto, the
required impracticability may result. If so, the next option under the EPA
guidelines is off-site in-kind mitigation within the same watershed. 74
Therefore, under both the EPA guidelines and the Louisiana regulations, if
the landowner exercised his veto and the permittee were required to purchase or
lease land away from the site to perform mitigation, and the overall project costs
were unreasonably increased by this added expense, or if no other land within
the basin was available for an individual project, it could then be argued that an
individual mitigation project would be "impracticable." Both systems would then
resort to the third option. However, under the federal system the third option is
the purchase of mitigation bank credits, Louisiana's first option. In the
Louisiana Coastal Zone, this is only an option for marsh replacement mitigation
credits. With any other wetland type then, under the 404 program, the individual
project is the permittee's only option; however, under the CUP, the permittee
may make a monetary contribution as compensatory mitigation.
Thus, even though the process is made easier under the CUP, by including
the monetary contribution option, it has become more complicated overall for the
applicant. He now must negotiate two contradictory mitigation regulations, the
federal and state systems, and possibly comply with both by performing separate
acts of mitigation. This duplicative mitigation is most likely when an applicant
opts to make a monetary contribution to the LDNR because this may not be
accepted by the Corps as sufficient mitigation. The Corps requires strict
sequencing and requires the applicant to provide compensatory mitigation in
advance of discharges into wetlands permitted under Section 404.75 The Corps
would apply the "in-lieu-fee mitigation arrangements" procedures to determine
if the monetary contribution would satisfy Section 404 compensatory mitigation
requirements and the LDNR would have to provide "assurances of success and
timely implementation," and "a formal agreement ... to define the conditions
under which its use is considered appropriate.' ' 76 A monetary contribution in
172. See Interview with Quin Kindler, supra note 78.
173. See 33 C.F.R. 325.4 (1997); 33 U.S.C.A. 1344, as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title
III, § 313(d), 101 Stat. 45 (Feb. 4, 1977).
174. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58611.
175. See 33 C.F.R 323 and 325.4 (1997).
176. EPA Policy Guidance Document, supra note 32, at 58613.
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advance to the LDNR for the implementation of project at some unstated point
in the future may not fit the bill.
Part of this problem is created in the statute by the landowner provision that
forces the permittee and the regulators to work around the landowner's
preference. The other part of the problem is created by the priority for
mitigation banks and the option for a monetary contribution offered by the state
regulations alone. Louisiana's black letter rules, as a whole, are incompatible
with the federal system.
However, both the LDNR and the Corps work very closely in practice to
meet the differing needs of each system. On paper, the regulations may require
something specific, yet agency personnel, in order to grant a permit, may
compromise. This flexibility is theoretically beneficial, ensuring that permitted
losses are mitigated under sound scientific principals. However commendable
this process, compromise of regulatory requirements by agency personnel should
not be condoned, much less necessary. Agency efficiency and resources would
be better utilized if legislators would make it possible for the LDNR to conform
its program to the Federal Section 404 program such that mitigation requirements
and options are uniform within Louisiana's Coastal Zone.
VII. CONCLUSION
Incompatibility that causes conflicting requirements creates the risk of
inadequate protection of critical wetlands. In order to address the incompatibili-
ties produced by the mitigation statute, the Louisiana Legislature should amend
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:214.41 to remove the landowner veto and variance
provisions. These provisions cause many problems, only one of which is
unnecessary interference with the agency's ability to carry out its duty to protect
natural resources. Their removal would allow the regulations to more closely
conform to the federal program.
However, if the landowner provision were to be removed from the statute
the monetary contribution provision would have less utility. The LDNR could
require on-site mitigation in keeping with the greater ecological benefit of
mitigating in-kind and on-site.
Even with an amendment removing the landowner veto, the LDNR
preference for mitigation banks over individual on-site projects will still have to
be addressed. The priority given to mitigation bank credits is apparently due not
only to the difficulty of requiring on-site mitigation because of the landowner
veto provision, but also the higher success rate of mitigation banks, the lack of
agency resources to monitor widely dispersed individual projects, and a desire to
spur the mitigation banking business in Louisiana as a conservation and
economic tool. If the landowner provision were to be removed from the statute,
it is likely that the LDNR would still prioritize compensatory mitigation options
in an order that fosters mitigation banking.
Given the present high rate of erosion, the LDNR may be overly optimistic
and unrealistic. The regulations cannot work as envisioned because on-site, in-
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kind, or at least within the same basin replacement of lost wetlands is preferred,
ideally with mitigation bank credits. However, credits are only available for
marshland mitigation. There is very little hope for the appearance of a variety
of banks in the coastal zone with the rate of subsidence so high, and with the oil
and gas industry continuing to utilize canals for oil and gas extraction and
transportation which exacerbates the subsidence problem.
The variance procedure provision in the statute should be removed because
it is unnecessary in light of the monetary contribution option offered in the
regulations. With the elimination of the variance procedure, and the retention of
the monetary contribution option, the LDNR can require a monetary contribution
when the overwhelming public interest of a project makes it worth carrying out
but preservation of the affected wetlands is impracticable.
The monetary contribution option and the mitigation bank credit option are
conceptually attractive for the agency. The acceptance of either bank credits or
a monetary contribution serves the needs of the LDNR by meeting the agency's
needs for efficiency, uniformity, long term control, and ease of monitoring;
however, the regulations need some additional work. Adding safeguards to the
monetary contribution option could eliminate the risk of the buy-a-permit system.
Alternatively, the LDNR could implement strict sequencingprocedures applicable
to all Louisiana projects and use the monetary contribution option in place of the
variance for "extenuating circumstances." For projects with "overriding public
interest," the monetary contribution option could be a type of quid pro quo
subject to the public notice and comment procedures. Additionally, if the Corps
uniformly accepts projects carried out by the LDNR with the monetary
contribution for the Section 404 permits, the risk of duplicative mitigation would
be reduced, if not eliminated. In sum, the LDNR should adopt clear policy to
address temporal habitat loss, grouping of smaller contributions to create large
projects, placement rules or reference to the permittee's placement rules, limits
on the secretary's discretion, and long-term security for the secretary-implement-
ed monetary contribution projects.
Because Louisiana is home to an abundant forty percent of the nation's
coastal wetlands, they are taken for granted.'77 Our economy is dependent
upon both the oil and gas industry and the fishing and seafood industry and each
are dependent upon the wetlands. The Louisiana Legislature is performing a
balancing act among conflicting conservation and development interests: the
economic interests of the oil and gas industry, private landowner interests, and
fishing and agricultural industry interests. By concentrating on juggling these
political interests, rather than focusing more fundamentally on protecting human
health and natural resources, the political machine misses the big picture. In
other words, without the natural resources which support these industries, there
will be nothing left to balance and juggle. The variance procedure and the
landowner veto are special interest provisions that undermine the effectiveness
177. Louisiana Coastal Law, Louisiana Sea Grant Newsletter (April 1989).
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of the mitigation requirement and demonstrate the Louisiana Legislature's apathy
about its responsibility to the rest of the nation for the preservation of forty
percent of the nation's coastal wetlands.
Louisiana should do what most states do when creating a regulatory program
that supplements a federal one. Louisiana should conform the CUP mitigation
requirements to the federal standards. Substantially conforming Louisiana's CUP
program to the federal Section 404 program would be beneficial to permittees,
regulators and overall wetland management efforts. Uniformity among the state
and federal system would increase predictability and certainty, decreasing project
delays and increasing the potential for coefficient efforts in meeting the national
"no net loss" goal. By streamlining the procedures, agencies would be able to
cooperatively share resources, save taxpayer money, and increase wetland
protection.
Kathrin Ellen Yates
